Michael Young, June 4, 2010
Italian Judge Antonio Casesse is trying to convince the public that everything is going well with the Special Tribunal.
When another senior employee of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon resigns, I develop warm feelings for Antonio Cassese. In his annual report earlier this year, the tribunal’s president reassured us that these departures were quite normal. Yet his increasingly strained assertions that the investigative process is going well suggest that what he’s really trying to do is avert a complete breakdown.
Radhia Achouri’s resignation last week as spokesperson for the prosecutor, Daniel Bellemare, was odd. Unlike the tribunal’s first registrar, Robin Vincent, and chief investigator Neguib “Nick” Kaldas, Achouri seemed to have a good relationship with Bellemare, and was part of his inner circle. I tried contacting Achouri to ask why she had left, but all I received was an out-of-office emailed response informing me that she would not return to work before February 2013.
It’s useless to speculate why Achouri walked, but there are two similarities between her exit and those of Vincent and Kaldas, as well as of the second registrar, David Tolbert, who departed earlier this year. The first is that in all cases there was no transition period; the resignations were relatively sudden, so that there was a lag between the time the individuals left and replacements found. If nothing else, this implied there was minimal coordination over the resignations.
The worst message an institution can send, particularly one dealing with a sensitive political assassination, is that it is prone to vacuums. And yet that is precisely the impression the Special Tribunal has created on four separate occasions, all in less than a year!
The second similarity between the resignations is that they intimated that leading tribunal officials found no compelling reason to stay on at their post. That may have been because they had received better job offers (as in the cases of Tolbert and Kaldas), or because they didn’t feel that indictments were forthcoming. Or it could have meant that they did not feel the tribunal would advance their career.
Whatever the reason, recall that the Special Tribunal is a revolutionary institution, the outgrowth of the first investigation of a political assassination ever by the United Nations. That so many of its members have jumped ship before indictments are issued hardly conveys that they view the body in such an exalted light.
Which brings us back to Cassese. The president, though a man of experience, has repeatedly blundered in recent months. A few weeks ago he told the Daily Star newspaper that he expected indictments to be issued later this year. Soon thereafter Cassese backtracked, issuing a less affirmative clarification: “What I in fact intended to say was that there are indications the prosecutor might submit an indictment by December 2010. I am sorry that I unwillingly caused this misunderstanding. Let me also add that of course the issuance of an indictment will depend on when the prosecutor determines there is enough evidence to support the submission of an indictment.”
Of course. But that statement of the obvious did not explain why Cassese committed an earlier mistake. In his report on the tribunal’s work, the president went into details of the Hariri assassination, discrediting himself as an objective arbiter over those details. Cassese later retreated, underlining that the information had been supplied by Bellemare, and therefore that he had reached no conclusions himself. However, the report was under his name, and the defense can argue that Cassese thus substantiated his lack of objectivity.
The real problem, however, and perhaps a reason why Achouri decided to call it a day, is that Cassese has too often spoken in the name of the prosecution. His ill-advised comments to the Daily Star, his repeated promises that indictments would be coming – and coming soon – and his transparent efforts to lend momentum to Bellemare’s sluggish work all hint strongly that the tribunal president is anxious.
And anxious he should be. This past Wednesday was the fifth anniversary of the assassination of Samir Kassir. That killing, like the many others that followed in the period 2005 to 2008, is also part of the mandate of the Special Tribunal. United Nations investigators never gave those ancillary killings the time and effort that they did the killing of the former prime minister, but in absolute terms they are just as important. Yet we are evidently no closer today to discovering who was behind all the crimes than we were five years ago.
Cassese knows this. If his surfeit of energy comes from a conviction that Bellemare needs a push, then we must ask what Bellemare needs to be pushed on. Does the prosecutor have enough material to indict, but fears presenting it to the tribunal? Does he not have enough to indict, but is telling Cassese otherwise? And where on earth is the trial process today? Now, we don’t even have Radhia Achouri to feed us the pitiful line that all goes well in the best of all worlds.
Michael Young is opinion editor of the Daily Star newspaper in Beirut. His book, The Ghosts of Martyrs Square: An Eyewitness Account of Lebanon’s Life Struggle (Simon & Schuster), has just been published.
June 4, 2010 - Now Lebanon - Trial and error in Leidschendam
June 3, 2010 - L'Orient le jour - TSL Le bâtonnier de Tripoli reçoit un juge français
Le bâtonnier de Tripoli, Antoine Airout, s'est entretenu hier avec le chef du bureau de la défense au sein du Tribunal spécial pour le Liban, le juge français François Roux, qui était accompagné d'une délégation formée de juges canadiens, français et britanniques.
June 3, 2010 - Now Lebanon - Iran and the STL frame Lebanon’s summer
Jean-Luc Vannier, June 3, 2010
The Lebanese municipal elections, which took place over several Sundays in May, failed to enlist the people’s enthusiasm. The high abstention rate, especially in the capital, where Christian votes symbolize the confrontation between the March 14 coalition and the pro-Syrian March 8 forces, proved the voters’ disavowal of elections, which – by and large – depict Lebanon under the worst light: a country of exacerbated clientelism and local mismatches that strive to preserve the interests of major aristocratic families. The Lebanese can hardly seem to remember the keen interest in the parliamentary elections of June 2009, which were theoretically a victory, even though it was stolen from them in practice due to the issue of Hezbollah’s weapons.
June: A “risky timeframe”
The prospect of a summer season with a record number of European tourists, according to predictions, is the only thought that raises people’s spirits in Lebanon, but only relatively so. The summer of 2010 seems already darkened by ominous clouds, spelling serious danger at best. An Israeli expert on security issues and a source close to Hezbollah both agreed that the Security Council meeting set to be held in June at the latest to discuss sanctions on Iran signals a “risky timeframe”. Whether in June or at a subsequent date, Hezbollah is gearing up for an inevitable war with Israel. “One month, six months or two years, it doesn’t matter,” says a Hezbollah supporter who believes adamantly that “the confrontation will extend into Israel this time around.” When asked whether they do not fear bombings, another party supporter boasts: “We have entire towns underground with tunnels connecting them to each other.” The aforementioned supporter asserts yet again: Following the renewal of the alliance between Syria, Iran and Hezbollah during Iranian President Ahmadinejad’s recent visit to Damascus, it is being said that “the Islamic Republic of Iran will not remain inactive.” It is useless to hope for disengaging the mighty Syrian neighbor from its Iranian protector, knowing that this assertion is meant primarily for the French diplomacy. Furthermore, this visit allowed the resolution of any lingering murkiness and mistrust between Hezbollah and Alawi leaders following Imad Mugniyah’s assassination.
On this side of the Litani, the Israeli strategy is being analyzed with the same prevailing assurance. According to Lebanese analyses, Israel is locked in a race against time and, thus, alternately uses provocations and reassuring statements. It also seems to be unsure about the outcome of a confrontation during which it would try to make the Lebanese-Syrian border watertight by forcing the international community to deploy UN troops along this border in exchange for a cessation of hostilities. Being convinced at the same time of Iran’s involvement and support for the Shia militia, Tel Aviv would be willing to bet on a conflict that would inevitably entail US support and military intervention, something which – according to the abovementioned source – Israel has failed to gain so far in times of peace.
A new “Blue Line”?
Even though Hezbollah tirelessly asserts that war is not about to break out, the party’s leadership still sent a circular to all headmasters of the Al-Hoda schools, which are financed by the party and reportedly teach the children of many party leaders, asking them to have the curriculum completed by the end of May, a full month before the ordinary end of the school year. Should this really be a cause for alarm? As to the sensitive issue of new missiles that were delivered to the pro-Iranian group, security officials – even within the United Nations – are now almost certain that such deliveries have indeed taken place. Some quote the inhabitants of Machghara, the most important town in the West Bekaa on the Litani’s right bank between the border crossing of Chtaura and the South, as saying discreetly that huge lorries roam the countryside at night under cover of the darkness resulting from power cuts.
In the same spirit, UNIFIL patrols are coming under repeated attacks launched by townsfolk. Western powers are also uncomfortable about LAF officials’ recent interpretation of the “Blue Line” ten years after it was made official following Israel’s withdrawal from South Lebanon. On the field, Lebanese officers make a difference between a “first Blue Line” between Naqoura and the Wazzani on the one hand and, on the other, a second such line from the Wazzani to the east along the Syrian border. The LAF considers this second zone “occupied territory” and refuses to quell – or even contain – the mounting civilian protests. This drove UNIFIL officials to wonder whether some Lebanese authorities do not have a “hidden agenda.” The situation was tense enough to call for a lightning visit by Egypt’s Foreign Minister Ahmad Abu al-Gheit, who seemingly came to Beirut on April 24 in an attempt to ask his Lebanese interlocutors to “reason with Hezbollah.” According to a high-ranking Shia official from the Amal Movement, it would be a waste of time since “Hezbollah’s leaders are convinced of the rightfulness of their actions” and “no one in Lebanon – not even [Prime Minister] Saad Hariri – can take any action against them.”
Pressure from Turkey
Druze leader Walid Jumblatt undoubtedly understood this and derived lessons from the aftermath of the Choueifat battle that pitted his supporters against Hezbollah’s in May 2008. Well before the parliamentary elections of June 2009, Walid Bey had initiated consultations aiming for a rapprochement with the Shia militia. Since then, he merely confirmed this trend by announcing his withdrawal from the March 14 coalition led by Saad Hariri, even if this change of alliances is far from being unanimously approved by his supporters. His clearly-hammered concern about “protecting his community” has not managed to silence those criticizing him. They certainly still respect their charismatic leader, but, as a taxi driver from Aley put it in his own words: “Yes to the Lebanese army, no to Hezbollah.”
While this might be yet another indirect consequence of Hezbollah’s rising influence, Turkey is also playing from now on an explicit role in the Lebanese “big game”. In fact, Ankara, for the first time, exerted pressure on the authorities in Beirut to prevent any Lebanese officials from attending the commemorations of the Armenian genocide on April 24 in Antelias (the seat of the Armenian Church) or in the Bourj Hammoud football stadium, where 60,000 people were assembled. This maneuver was denounced by Tashnaq official and Armenian MP for the Metn district Hagop Pakradounian, who said to Lebanese officials: “Beware of hurting the Armenians’ dignity.” Moreover, rumor has it that Turkey’s activism in Lebanon does not stop here, as Ankara has been financing for many years “the reinsertion of Sufi brotherhoods thanks to influential tribes that settled in the country’s north.” This goes without mentioning the “construction of schools for Sunnis of Turkish origin in the Baalbek area.” Turkey is also building the necessary ties with Shia families in the South by handing out a grant for building a football stadium. According to a US Embassy diplomat in Beirut, the United States “is favorable to these Turkish initiatives,” which aim to develop a certain level of protection against the Shia, a guarantee that Egypt or Saudi Arabia cannot offer. For his part, Antranik Dakessian asserts that “consensual democracy is being called into question, and this worries the Armenian community.” According to the Haigazian University chancellor, this community is undergoing profound changes manifested in “one of the lowest birth rates compared to the remaining communities in Lebanon”, in addition to a tendency to become poorer. “Only one-third of Armenians are economically self-sufficient,” he says, “while 30% live on financial support from abroad, and the remaining one-third clearly live well below the poverty line.”
Is the STL to issue an indictment in the autumn?
Even if nothing unsettles the quietness of Lebanon’s summer, the autumn might bring in some turbulence. Despite its feared discretion, several security sources said the Special Tribunal for Lebanon will make the headlines in the fall. The office of the STL prosecutor has considerably stepped up its investigations, which recently extended to the Directorate General of General Security despite the reluctance of its director, who, despite his renowned closeness to Hezbollah, was forced to yield to the state prosecutor’s order. Without revealing the same fingerprints they wanted to check, investigators thus had free access to the alphabetical folders of the Lebanese intelligence services central organism. At the same time, other investigators made progress on the identity of people who bought metal objects, pieces of which were found scattered around the scene of the explosion that killed former PM Rafik Hariri and his companions. In the case of Marwan Hamadeh, a former minister close to Walid Jumblatt who was wounded in an assassination attempt in 2004, sources in Beirut assert that the STL prosecutor already has all the judicial leads in hand.
The Lebanese justice minister predicted that the procedures may be spread out in time in order to avert any civil unrest (see here ). Still, UN officials expect the STL to issue an indictment, which would publish in full the names of all those suspected of involvement in the assassination of former PM Rafik Hariri in February 2005. Those who were wondering about the STL’s independence and criticized its slow pace now seem to fear the effects of its dynamics and the consequences of its determination.
