This blog of the Lebanese Center for Human Rights (CLDH) aims at granting the public opinion access to all information related to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon : daily press review in english, french and arabic ; UN documents, etc...

Ce blog du
Centre Libanais des droits humains (CLDH) a pour objectif de rendre accessible à l'opinion publique toute l'information relative au Tribunal Spécial pour le Liban : revue de presse quotidienne en anglais, francais et arabe ; documents onusiens ; rapports, etc...
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PRESS REVIEW

October 22, 2009 - Daily Star - Exercising the right of reply: General Sayyed's response to Chibli Mallat

The Daily Star newspaper published on October 8, 2009, an article written by Chibli Mallat. The media office of General Jamil al-Sayyed asks that the following response be fully published on the same page as Mallat’s article in accordance with media laws.
First: we regret to have concluded from Mallat’s article that he was insufficiently informed about the facts Sayyed had explained in previous press interviews and statements. Had his information been ample, he would have saved himself the trouble of committing errors in his current and previous articles.
Before responding again, we would like to say that we hoped Mallat’s last article had tackled the issue of the false witness Mohammed Zuhair al-Siddiq in more than just a small paragraph. The reason is that Siddiq had been considered for the last four years by March 14 and the Cedar Revolution as a national hero, and was the political mean for the Lebanese authority – Saad Hariri, Walid Jumblatt and for other figures – to enforce the arbitrary political arrest of the four generals.
Second: Mallat said in his article that Sayyed “ought to help find the assassins of Hariri, and of the two hundred other people killed or maimed by a pattern of murderous attacks … Had the assassins been apprehended then, and a proper judicial process followed, we would not have needed the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) in the first place, and most, if not all, our Lebanese friends would still be with us.”
Sayyed wonders if the author forgot that at the time of the crime, March 14 and the Cedar Revolution forbade Lebanese security agencies from investigating the case, and asked for the resignation of security officials. March 14 and the Cedar Revolution also directly accused these officials, as well as Syria, of having committed the crime. Sayyed wonders how these security agencies could have exercised their duties when they were being attacked by political accusations that were later proven false by the International Commission and the STL.
Did Mallat not read that – in spite of all the pressure put on us and despite the short time available – we were able to uncover the eight mobile telephone lines that were involved in the assassination? Did he not read that our agencies were the ones to confirm that the explosion was suicidal and was executed above the ground via a Mitsubishi truck?
Did he not read as well that our agencies – in spite of the pressure put on them and the little time that was available – were able to determine the circumstances of the disappearance of Ahmad Abu Adas as well as the names of his partners and their movements outside the Lebanese territories? Did Mallat not read at the time that his March 14 party and the Cedar Revolution insisted that the explosion took place under the ground; that the Mitsubishi truck did not exist; that the suicide bomber did not exist; and that Ahmad Abu Adas had no relations with Al-Qaeda or with radical networks.
Did he not read that the conclusions of our agencies were the same as those made by the International Investigation Commission four years later?
Why did March 14 and the Cedar Revolution accept the commission’s conclusions, which cost millions of dollars, but refuse the same conclusions that our security agencies reached within two months – despite working under pressure?
Does Mallat not see that unveiling the truth and arresting the perpetrators would have been easier for Lebanon had the former chiefs of security continued their investigations and had they not been targets of political arrest through Siddiq and other false witnesses? Does he not see that tens of assassinations and explosions occurred in Lebanon after Sayyed abandoned his position and was arrested along with his colleagues? We are referring here to the series of assassinations starting with the killing of Samir Kassir until the killing of Wissam Eid.
Does Mallat not wonder why the current security chiefs, starting with Lieutenant Colonel Wissam al-Hassan, have not yet been able to arrest one criminal, even after four years of their appointment? Does he not realize that the passages in his article that referred to the international investigator Peter Fitzgerald fully apply to the current security, judicial and political situation in Lebanon; more so than they did to the country’s situation at our time?
Third: in the matter concerning Samir Kassir, Sayyed wishes that Mallat had read our previous response and news statements with care, and that he had been informed of what we had told the Lebanese Judiciary and the International Investigation Commission. Had he done so, he would have known that Sayyed never met with Samir Kassir and never invited him for “a cup of coffee” nor for “a cup of tea” at his office.
All that happened was that the General Security office officially and publicly examined the Lebanese passport of Kassir who was born of a Palestinian father and a Syrian mother. The passport was later publicly returned to its owner and an official press-release was issued concerning the affair.
As for Kassir being followed, it was by the intelligence of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) at the time when Emile Lahoud was the president and Michel Sleiman was the LAF commander. The LAF members would follow Kassir, but would not harm him even after he had directly offended the LAF in one of his articles: an offence that led Sayyed to have a telephone dispute with Kassir. It should be noted that Kassir had requested the appearance of Sayyed on his television program and had made this request through Sayyed’s son who was one of Kassir’s students at Universite Saint-Joseph.
Fourth: as for Mallat’s description of the Lebanese government during the mandate of presidents Emile Lahoud and Elias Hrawi as a police state, we ask: why did Rafik Hariri, Walid Jumblatt and tens of other March 14 and Cedar Revolution figures participate in that state? Why did so many of them rob the government ministries and their funds as well as the Downtown Beirut trade center?
While they were doing so, Sayyed was establishing the best armed forces and the best general security institution Lebanon has known- and to this everyone can testify. If Mallat was irritated by this “State of Security,” then what is his current opinion about the state today, the so called State of March 14 and the State of sovereignty, freedom and independence? Where are security, sovereignty, administration, economy and politics in this rotten State that is not even able to form a government without foreign recommendations starting from the US until the Arab Gulf?
Fifth: it is true that the assassination of Rafik Hariri in 2005 was a terrible crime and that Sayyed was at the head of security agencies at the time. It is also true however that even more horrible crimes occurred before and after this assassination in Lebanon, in the United States on September 11, at the Madrid train station, at the London underground, in the streets of Baghdad. It is true as well that none of these countries immediately put their chiefs of security in prison; they instead dedicated time to investigations and the unveiling of the truth. Nonetheless, Lebanon – during the time of sovereignty, freedom and independence – did not only indict the four generals at once but also provided the case with false witnesses like Siddiq, in order to blame the generals and Syria. This is criminal and ethical degradation in which Lebanon is unique in the world.
Finally, to answer Mallat’s invitation to help reveal the truth and to clear our name – as Mallat had said – we say that we are not players in this field and we do not need to clear our name after the STL cleared it for us and uncovered the false witnesses.
What we ask of you, Mallat, is that you advise Saad Hariri, Walid Jumblatt, Marwan Hamada, Saeed Mirza, Wissam al-Hassan, Fares Khashan and many others from March 14 and the Cedar Revolution to clear their own names concerning the assassination of Rafik Hariri.
We ask that you also advise them to get back their false witness Siddiq and try him in Lebanon. When that is done, the truth may be revealed because those who invent false witnesses to mislead investigations in the assassination of Hariri undoubtedly know who the real criminal is, and are trying to protect him.
Why else would they invent Siddiq and many others? Why else would they falsely accuse us and Syria until their lies were recently uncovered by the STL?

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Background - خلفية

On 13 December 2005 the Government of the Lebanese Republic requested the UN to establish a tribunal of an international character to try all those who are alleged responsible for the attack of 14 february 2005 that killed the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others. The United Nations and the Lebanese Republic consequently negotiated an agreement on the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

Liens - Links - مواقع ذات صلة

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, David Schenker , March 30, 2010 . Beirut Spring: The Hariri Tribunal Goes Hunting for Hizballah


Frederic Megret, McGill University, 2008. A special tribunal for Lebanon: the UN Security Council and the emancipation of International Criminal Justice


International Center for Transitional Justice Handbook on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, April 10, 2008


United Nations
Conférence de presse de Nicolas Michel, 19 Sept 2007
Conférence de presse de Nicolas Michel, 27 Mars 2008


Département d'Etat américain
* 2009 Human Rights report
* 2008 Human Rights report
* 2007 Human Rights report
* 2006 Human Rights report
* 2005 Human Rights report



ICG - International Crisis Group
The Hariri Tribunal: Separate the Political and the Judicial, 19 July, 2007. [Fr]


HCSS - Hague Centre for strategic studies
Hariri, Homicide and the Hague


Human Rights Watch
* Hariri Tribunal can restore faith in law, 11 may 2006
* Letter to Secretary-General Kofi Annan, april 27, 2006


Amnesty International
* STL insufficient without wider action to combat impunity
* Liban : le Tribunal de tous les dangers, mai 2007
* Jeu de mecano


Courrier de l'ACAT - Wadih Al Asmar
Le Tribunal spécial pour le Liban : entre espoir et inquiétude


Georges Corm
La justice penale internationale pour le Liban : bienfait ou malediction?


Nadim Shedadi and Elizabeth Wilmshurt, Chatham House
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon : the UN on Trial?, July 2007


Issam Michael Saliba, Law Library of Congress
International Tribunals, National Crimes and the Hariri Assassination : a novel development in International Criminal Law, June 2007


Mona Yacoubian, Council on Foreign Relations
Linkages between Special UN Tribunal, Lebanon, and Syria, June 1, 2007