This blog of the Lebanese Center for Human Rights (CLDH) aims at granting the public opinion access to all information related to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon : daily press review in english, french and arabic ; UN documents, etc...

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Centre Libanais des droits humains (CLDH) a pour objectif de rendre accessible à l'opinion publique toute l'information relative au Tribunal Spécial pour le Liban : revue de presse quotidienne en anglais, francais et arabe ; documents onusiens ; rapports, etc...
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PRESS REVIEW

June 30, 2010 -The National - The Hariri tribunal is so inept, it almost seems deliberate

Last Updated: June 30. 2010 6:14PM UAE / June 30. 2010 2:14PM GMT Recently, one of the men arrested in the investigation of the 2005 assassination of Lebanon’s former prime minister, Rafiq Hariri, pursued a revealing legal manoeuvre. He demanded that the special tribunal set up by the United Nations a year ago to try those suspected of the murder show him the evidence used to arrest him.

The man is Jamil alSayyed, the former head of Lebanon’s General Security directorate and one of four generals arrested on the advice of United Nations investigators a few months after the Hariri murder. Mr al Sayyed spent four years behind bars, until he was released last year along with his colleagues by the tribunal prosecutor, Daniel Bellemare, because there was not enough evidence to indict them. Mr al Sayyed’s request shows how onetime suspects are now willing to take the tribunal on, largely because it has lost all momentum.


Mr al Sayyed’s innocence is a matter of conjecture. He was a main cog in the Syrian-dominated security network in Lebanon during the time Damascus ruled directly over the country. It was this network that investigators believe was behind Mr Hariri’s killing. The detention of Mr al Sayyed and his associates was repeatedly reconfirmed by the body set up to investigate the killing, the United Nations International Independent Investigation Commission (UNIIIC), whose last head was Mr Bellemare, before he became tribunal prosecutor. Yet it is also true that the investigators did not turn their suspicions about Mr al Sayyed into indictable offences. Therein lies the tribunal’s difficulties.


Five years after the Hariri assassination, we are nowhere closer to seeing the guilty accused. Back in 2005, the decision of the UN Security Council to set up an investigation of the Hariri killing was an innovation. It was the first time that the international organisation had looked into a political assassination, the rationale being that this would help deter such crimes in the future. UNIIIC was set up, and its first commissioner was Detlev Mehlis, a German judge who had investigated high-profile terrorist crimes in former West Berlin, including the 1986 LaBelle discotheque bombing.


Mr Mehlis had no doubt that the Hariri assassination was ordered by Syria, even if Lebanese individuals or groups also participated in the operation. His team began a police investigation, and interviewed Syrian officials and intelligence officers inside Syria and abroad. On the eve of his departure in December 2005, Mr Mehlis even recommended to his successor, the Belgian judge Serge Brammertz, that he arrest the former head of Syria’s military intelligence apparatus in Lebanon.


Mr Brammertz never did so. In fact he arrested no one during his two-year tenure. While this may have been because one of Mr Mehlis’ witnesses appeared unreliable, there were far deeper problems in the Belgian’s investigation. He cut back on police officers and added analysts. Analyses can address details of a crime, but only a police investigation, which entails taking suspects into custody and using their testimonies to unravel the decision-making hierarchy, can identify the guilty. In fact, Mr Brammertz did not investigate much at all before handing over to Mr Bellemare.


Was this intentional on Mr Brammertz’s part? I contacted him in April of last year for a book I was writing to give him an opportunity to respond to my criticisms of his work. I also wanted him to reply to allegations levelled at him by Mr Mehlis in an interview I conducted with the German for The Wall Street Journal. Mr Brammertz declined. However, it was difficult not to notice that his appointment after serving on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon – namely, as prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia – was a promotion by the UN, even though his performance in Beirut hardly merited such an accolade.


Perhaps that was precisely what the UN liked in Mr Brammertz. As Mr Mehlis later recalled, when he met Kofi Annan before starting his mission, the UN secretary-general told him that “he did not want another trouble spot”. Mr Mehlis did not oblige. He raised the heat on Syria and although he received Security Council backing, which strengthened his mandate, the UN bureaucracy must have winced at the tensions resulting from these confrontations.


Mr Bellemare has been a different kettle of fish. A Canadian judge, he had no experience of terrorist crimes when he came in. His tenure as commissioner, then as prosecutor, has produced little apparent progress. He seems to have information pointing to on-the-ground involvement by Hizbollah in Mr Hariri’s elimination, but two key questions remain: Does Mr Bellemare have enough to indict? And if he does, who will the prosecutor point the finger at, low-level operatives or higher-level decision-makers, including Syrian officials?


For now, we can only speculate. However, there seems less and less doubt that the two-year tenure of Mr Brammertz damaged the prosecution’s case, perhaps fatally. Mr Bellemare also discredited the tribunal by awaiting its formation before releasing the four generals, when, aware that there would be no indictments, he could have requested that the Lebanese authorities do so earlier.

Worst of all, key figures have left the tribunal one after the other, including Mr Bellemare’s chief investigator and two registrars. This implied, at the very least, that these individuals did not expect indictments in the foreseeable future; but in several specific cases the exits also hinted at Mr Bellemare’s managerial shortcomings.


Indictments may come later this year, but it seems doubtful, given what we know, that those who ordered the assassination will be charged. The zeal with which the tribunal’s president, Antonio Cassese, has pressed for this deadline indicates he is putting pressure on Mr Bellemare. Mr Cassese knows that the tribunal’s funding is closely tied to signs of genuine progress. He is right to be worried.


Michael Young is opinion editor of the Daily Star newspaper in Beirut. His book The Ghosts of Martyrs Square: An Eyewitness Account of Lebanon’s Life Struggle has just been published.

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Background - خلفية

On 13 December 2005 the Government of the Lebanese Republic requested the UN to establish a tribunal of an international character to try all those who are alleged responsible for the attack of 14 february 2005 that killed the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others. The United Nations and the Lebanese Republic consequently negotiated an agreement on the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

Liens - Links - مواقع ذات صلة

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, David Schenker , March 30, 2010 . Beirut Spring: The Hariri Tribunal Goes Hunting for Hizballah


Frederic Megret, McGill University, 2008. A special tribunal for Lebanon: the UN Security Council and the emancipation of International Criminal Justice


International Center for Transitional Justice Handbook on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, April 10, 2008


United Nations
Conférence de presse de Nicolas Michel, 19 Sept 2007
Conférence de presse de Nicolas Michel, 27 Mars 2008


Département d'Etat américain
* 2009 Human Rights report
* 2008 Human Rights report
* 2007 Human Rights report
* 2006 Human Rights report
* 2005 Human Rights report



ICG - International Crisis Group
The Hariri Tribunal: Separate the Political and the Judicial, 19 July, 2007. [Fr]


HCSS - Hague Centre for strategic studies
Hariri, Homicide and the Hague


Human Rights Watch
* Hariri Tribunal can restore faith in law, 11 may 2006
* Letter to Secretary-General Kofi Annan, april 27, 2006


Amnesty International
* STL insufficient without wider action to combat impunity
* Liban : le Tribunal de tous les dangers, mai 2007
* Jeu de mecano


Courrier de l'ACAT - Wadih Al Asmar
Le Tribunal spécial pour le Liban : entre espoir et inquiétude


Georges Corm
La justice penale internationale pour le Liban : bienfait ou malediction?


Nadim Shedadi and Elizabeth Wilmshurt, Chatham House
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon : the UN on Trial?, July 2007


Issam Michael Saliba, Law Library of Congress
International Tribunals, National Crimes and the Hariri Assassination : a novel development in International Criminal Law, June 2007


Mona Yacoubian, Council on Foreign Relations
Linkages between Special UN Tribunal, Lebanon, and Syria, June 1, 2007