This blog of the Lebanese Center for Human Rights (CLDH) aims at granting the public opinion access to all information related to the Special Tribunal for Lebanon : daily press review in english, french and arabic ; UN documents, etc...

Ce blog du
Centre Libanais des droits humains (CLDH) a pour objectif de rendre accessible à l'opinion publique toute l'information relative au Tribunal Spécial pour le Liban : revue de presse quotidienne en anglais, francais et arabe ; documents onusiens ; rapports, etc...
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PRESS REVIEW

March 26, 2010 - Now Lebanon - Is Lebanon scared of the Hariri tribunal?


By Michael Young

Tawhid Movement leader Wiam Wahhab has sent Lebanon and the Special Tribunal a message from Syria. (Archive)
If there were lingering doubts that it was Syria that leaked information to the German magazine Der Spiegel last year indicating that Hezbollah had participated in the assassination of Rafik Hariri, they were dissipated when the preeminent Syrian megaphone in Beirut, Wiam Wahhab, informed us this week that an investigating team from the Special Tribunal for Lebanon had interviewed Hezbollah members.

Wahhab’s message was simple: Accusing Hezbollah in the killing of Hariri could have dire consequences for Lebanon, as it might provoke a confrontation between Sunnis and Shia. While Lebanon officially continues to support the work of the tribunal, you will hear more frequently these days that many Lebanese officials quietly agree with Wahhab. They really just want the Hariri case to go away.

That has long been the calculation of the Syrians. In a meeting between Bashar al-Assad and the United Nations secretary general, Ban Ki-moon, in April 2007, Syria’s president implicitly linked Hezbollah to the Hariri crime. His words were leaked to the French daily Le Monde, where Assad was quoted as saying that instability in Lebanon “will worsen if the special [Hariri] tribunal is established. Particularly if it is established under Chapter VII [of the UN Charter]. This might easily cause a conflict that would degenerate into civil war, provoking divisions between Sunnis and Shiites [sic] from the Mediterranean to the Caspian Sea ... This would have serious consequences beyond Lebanon.”

The exchange told us many things. First, that if Syria was so keen to prevent a tribunal under Chapter VII, that meant it had something to hide. It also told us that Assad was aware that Hezbollah might have participated in the assassination of the former prime minister, since why else would he have brought up, completely out of the blue, the possibility of a Sunni-Shia civil war? In turn, this might explain why, when Assad was ignored and the tribunal formed under Chapter VII anyway, the Syrians perhaps decided that everyone needed a stronger dose of reality and leaked the information to Der Spiegel.

What Wahhab did, doubtless at the instigation of Damascus, was to bring the message home once more, now that the prosecutor of the Lebanon tribunal, Daniel Bellemare, has decided to take more witness statements, including those of Hezbollah members. For what the Syrian regime fears most is that an accusation against the party might take a roundabout route that eventually leads in its own direction.

After all, the Syrians have carefully read the reports of the UN investigators over the years. Recall that in his first report in March 2006, the then-head of the United Nations commission, Serge Brammertz, atypically provided interesting information when he wrote: “The Commission believes that there is a layer of perpetrators between those who initially commissioned the crime and the actual perpetrators on the day of the crime, namely those who enabled the crime to occur.”

In other words, there was a suicide bomber; there was a group of individuals who surveyed Hariri’s movements, and this appears to be where Hezbollah comes in; and there were those who commissioned the operation, and it doesn’t take much to guess who they were. But when Brammertz failed to initiate an aggressive police investigation in Syria, the UN was left to focus on Lebanese participation in the crime.

Criticism has been directed at the UN investigation for Brammertz’s unwillingness to conduct a real police investigation in Syria when he was at his post between 2006 and 2008. However, that should not mean the Lebanese are off the hook. If Bellemare does manage to put out an indictment against Lebanese parties, will the government in Beirut be willing to bear the consequences? After four years during which the tribunal was front and center in the political debate, especially in the rhetoric of the March 14 coalition; during which people were killed or injured on the tribunal’s behalf; is Lebanon today getting cold feet?

News reports suggest that Hezbollah has allowed a small number of its members summoned by Daniel Bellemare to be questioned. That’s interesting in itself. But what about the others who have not been made available to the prosecution? If they refuse to come forward, Bellemare has the option of compelling the Lebanese to bring them in. And if the Lebanese fail to do so, he has the latitude to go to the Security Council. He may choose this path, or he may not. But sooner or later the Lebanese authorities will have to take a clear position on the tribunal.

The Lebanese political class is happy only when floating in ambiguity. Yet that’s not acceptable in the case of a major political crime that led to the formation of a landmark tribunal. The UN, for all its faults, took Lebanon seriously in 2005 by creating an independent investigation of the Hariri assassination. The Lebanese must now show they deserved it.

Michael Young is opinion editor of the Daily Star newspaper in Beirut.

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Background - خلفية

On 13 December 2005 the Government of the Lebanese Republic requested the UN to establish a tribunal of an international character to try all those who are alleged responsible for the attack of 14 february 2005 that killed the former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri and 22 others. The United Nations and the Lebanese Republic consequently negotiated an agreement on the establishment of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon.

Liens - Links - مواقع ذات صلة

The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, David Schenker , March 30, 2010 . Beirut Spring: The Hariri Tribunal Goes Hunting for Hizballah


Frederic Megret, McGill University, 2008. A special tribunal for Lebanon: the UN Security Council and the emancipation of International Criminal Justice


International Center for Transitional Justice Handbook on the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, April 10, 2008


United Nations
Conférence de presse de Nicolas Michel, 19 Sept 2007
Conférence de presse de Nicolas Michel, 27 Mars 2008


Département d'Etat américain
* 2009 Human Rights report
* 2008 Human Rights report
* 2007 Human Rights report
* 2006 Human Rights report
* 2005 Human Rights report



ICG - International Crisis Group
The Hariri Tribunal: Separate the Political and the Judicial, 19 July, 2007. [Fr]


HCSS - Hague Centre for strategic studies
Hariri, Homicide and the Hague


Human Rights Watch
* Hariri Tribunal can restore faith in law, 11 may 2006
* Letter to Secretary-General Kofi Annan, april 27, 2006


Amnesty International
* STL insufficient without wider action to combat impunity
* Liban : le Tribunal de tous les dangers, mai 2007
* Jeu de mecano


Courrier de l'ACAT - Wadih Al Asmar
Le Tribunal spécial pour le Liban : entre espoir et inquiétude


Georges Corm
La justice penale internationale pour le Liban : bienfait ou malediction?


Nadim Shedadi and Elizabeth Wilmshurt, Chatham House
The Special Tribunal for Lebanon : the UN on Trial?, July 2007


Issam Michael Saliba, Law Library of Congress
International Tribunals, National Crimes and the Hariri Assassination : a novel development in International Criminal Law, June 2007


Mona Yacoubian, Council on Foreign Relations
Linkages between Special UN Tribunal, Lebanon, and Syria, June 1, 2007